

COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"They" (the French Revolutionists) "forget that, in England, not one shilling of Paper Money of any description is received but of choice; that the whole has had its origin in cash, actually deposited; and that it is convertible, at pleasure, in an instant, and without the smallest loss, into cash again. Our Paper is of value in commerce, because in land it is of none. It is powerful on Change, because in Westminster-hall it is impotent. In payment of a debt of twenty shillings a creditor may refuse all the paper of the bank of England. Nor is there among us a single public security, of any quality or nature whatsoever, that is enforced by authority. In fact it might be easily shewn, that our paper wealth, instead of lessening the real coin, has a tendency to increase it; instead of being a substitute for money, it only facilitates its entry, its exit, and its circulation; that it is the symbol of prosperity, and not the badge of distress. Never was a scarcity of cash, and an exuberance of paper, a subject of complaint in this nation."—BURKE. Reflections, 1790.

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SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PAPER-MONEY.—Look at the Motto, English Reader. Look at the Motto; and, when you have looked well at it, you, too, will, I think, be disposed to make some "REFLECTIONS;" or, if you are not so disposed, I beg leave to recommend to you to lay this paper aside at once; for, I will venture to affirm, that no reading whatever upon political subjects, can be of any use to you.—It was just twenty years ago when Mr. Burke thus described the state of the bank-paper in England, and thus taunted (not altogether unjustly) the Revolutionists in France, who had just at that time set afloat a paper-money system. But, view the state of things now!—The war, which Pitt began soon after these Reflections of Mr. Burke's were published, was, by Pitt and his followers, called a war of finance. How, then, has that war succeeded thus far? The reader must remember Pitt's frequent boasts of having reduced the French to the utmost distress as to pecuniary and financial matters. His notorious assertion, that they were "in the very gulph of bankruptcy," has frequently been quoted; and, the writings of Sir FRANCIS D'IVERNOIS and of GENTZ cannot be forgotten. Where are now all their foretellings?—The useful train of reflection for the English reader, upon looking at the motto, is this:—How changed are things since 1790! What a great, and, to us, what a fearful change, has taken place! Whence has it proceeded? What has been the cause? Who have been the actors?—Has the change proceeded from the superior wisdom and virtues of the French? No: that we will not allow. From the interposition of Divine Providence in

their favour? No: for we cannot allow that such people, who have openly railed at religion, should be the favourites of Divine Providence; and, besides, is there a Speech, made by the king to the parliament, during this long war, in which the king does not express his gratitude for the great aid which he has received and hopes to receive from Divine Providence? Is the cause to be looked for in the liking, which the people of the several nations of Europe have had for the French Revolutionists in preference to their old rulers? No: for we all along have, and still do, aver most positively, that the people of the several countries of Europe love their good old rulers and hate the French Revolutionists, and especially Buonaparté.—Here, then, is, for once, a great, a tremendous, effect without a cause.—But, as to the actors; as to those, who have had the management of things, on our part, we know them very well. Pitt and his followers (for the poor Foxites were, in effect, quite sunk into that same description of persons) have had the whole affairs of the nation in their hands from 1790 to the year 1810, and in those hands the nation's affairs are to this moment. Let not the OUTS pretend, that they would have done better; for, there is not a single man of them, who has not eulogized Pitt, whose debts they voted that the nation should pay upon the score of his merits as a minister; and whose system of finance, in particular, every man of them has applauded.—No: there are no distinctions to make; but, to get rid of all ground for cavil, upon this score, let us say, that, between them and amongst them, the two sets, the INS and the OUTS, have had in

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‘their hands all the resources of this nation since the day when Mr. Burke wrote the passage here taken as a motto. Well, then, to whom, if not to them, are we to look for a responsibility for this awful change? Never tell about this accident or that accident; those accidents should have been provided against. You would have done so and so, perchance you will say, if the Dutch had fought or if the Neapolitans had not run away. Aye; but, it was your business to foresee what the Dutch and the Neapolitans and the Prussians and Bavarians and every body else would do. At any rate, you cannot say, that this change is to be ascribed to *Sir Francis Burdett*! He has had none of the powers of the state in his hands. He has had the expending of none of our taxes. He has, indeed, and so have I, found fault with measures; given it as our opinion, that such and such measures would and must lead to harm; but, these opinions, so far from being acted upon, have insured us an abundance of malevolent abuse. Of this fact, then, there can be no doubt: that, let what will be the state of affairs; let the change since 1790 be what it will, *Sir Francis Burdett* and those who think with him have had no hand, no act or part, in the producing of that change; and that the whole of the change, be it for good or for evil, belongs exclusively to the INS and the OUTS between them, and to those of the people, who approve of either the one set or the other. The change is the work of their own hands; to them it wholly belongs; to them, therefore, must be left the task of making the world see and the nation feel, that it is a change for the better.’—I shall now add some observations to those which I made upon the subject of paper-money last week; but, before I proceed to those observations, it is necessary to correct an error, committed at the bottom of page 108, and in the bottom line save one. It is this: instead of “ten times” read “a tenth part.” The context does, indeed, pretty clearly point out to the reader to make this correction; but, it happens in a passage of so much importance, that it would not have been right in me to leave it unnoticed.—I now come to my intended observations, which have been suggested by a little paragraph that appeared in the news-papers of Saturday last, the 28th of July, in these words:—“A seizure of nine thousand

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guineas, intended for exportation, was, on Thursday, made in the River. The specie was discovered on board a small vessel which had cleared out in ballast. A Captain in a Volunteer Corps was the fortunate detector of this prohibited merchandize.”—Thus, then, on Thursday, the 26th of July, on the very day, and, perhaps, at the very hour, when I was writing the 109th page of my last Number: at the very time when I was telling my readers, that the guineas, being degraded by the society of the paper, would go away to countries where they would not be so degraded, and where they would pass for their real worth; that the guineas would still pass from hoard to hoard in company with the paper, or from a hoard to the sea side; but that it was impossible they should circulate in such society for any length of time: on the day, and, perhaps, at the very moment, that I was putting this opinion upon paper, it now appears, that no less than nine thousand of these Jacobin vagabonds were detected in the act of getting off out of the country. They were, it seems, got upon the river; fairly afloat; just about to hoist sail, when the Volunteer Captain discovered and stopped them. Jacobin rascals! What, then, they will not stay here to keep company with the loyal paper!—It would be a curious thing to follow these Jacobin Guineas now, after their being brought back. It would be curious to follow them in their dispersion, and to see through what new channels they would endeavour again to make their escape.—Every one must, I think, be now convinced that the gold will never again circulate upon a footing with the present paper-money; and that the only way to bring it back again into circulation, and, indeed, into the country, is to remove every obstacle to the purchase or sale of it. A Jew was, as the reader will, probably, remember, sometime ago prosecuted for selling guineas for more than their nominal worth in bank-notes. A bill of indictment was found against him. I have not seen, that he has been brought to trial. But, this prosecution, though left in this state, would be quite sufficient to prevent an open traffic in guineas; and, that being the case, the possessors will inevitably hoard or smuggle; for, to suppose that any person will voluntarily lay out a guinea, while there is paper of our present sort to be had, is an absurdity too gross to be tolerated for one single moment.—In 1803, there was



work published under this title :
"GUINEAS AN ENCUMBRANCE."

—The author spent much more time than was necessary in shewing, that if *paper* answered all the purposes of *gold*, it was a great saving to the nation to make use of a paper instead of a gold currency. Then, taking it for granted, that our paper *did answer* all the purposes of *gold*, he, of course, came to the conclusion, that the nation derived great advantages from the paper-system, and that *Guineas were an encumbrance*, agreeably to the proposition in the title page.—The error of this gentleman was a very vulgar one indeed. He had no other notion of the purposes of money than *merely that of its passing from hand to hand*, without any reference whatever to its losing or retaining its original worth. He took up the notion that the mere circumstance of its passing was a complete proof of its goodness in every respect. And, hence he took it for granted, that the paper answered *all the purposes* of *gold*. But, we have now seen, and the people of Salisbury, Shaftsbury, Cork, and other places, have most severely *felt*, that paper does not answer *all* the purposes of *gold*; for, if there had been a gold in place of a paper currency, it is evident to every man, that the miseries recently occasioned, by the latter, would not have befallen the people, who now find, I fancy, *paper*, and not *guineas*, to be a sad *encumbrance*.—What has now happened is, however, but a *little taste* of the evils appertaining to a paper-money, not exchangeable into gold or silver at the will of the owner. There are many other evils which are now in operation, working heavily against the happiness of the nation; but, were there no other than that at this moment experienced, that one would be quite enough to silence the author of "*GUINEAS AN ENCUMBRANCE*."

—The motto, which I have placed at the head of this sheet, was written long before the present system of paper-money took place. The author little imagined, at the time when he wrote that passage, that the day was so near at hand when a law would be passed rendering the tender of bank-notes to the amount of a debt a *protection against an arrest for such debt*. Since that time, the bank in Threadneedle street has been quite another thing than what it was before. The bank-note has now some power in *Westminster Hall*. And, do we not see the consequences? Yes; some of them; but, good God! how

small a part of those consequences, unless some means be soon adopted effectually to counteract the natural consequences of the fall of the paper-money!—I have some observations to offer now upon the still *more recent* failures; but, I will first notice the Letters of two correspondents, which will be found in another part of this Number.—The *FIRST* relates to a remark of mine (in the last Number, page 110,) in the way of answer to a letter then before me, from this same correspondent, upon the subject of *rents and taxes*, as affected by the paper-money. The letter, now inserted from that correspondent (MR. CAMPBELL) explains his meaning; and, at the same time, suggests to me the utility of proposing and discussing before-hand, the measures that it would, in the contingency contemplated, be proper to adopt, so as to prevent the *spirit of contracts*, of all sorts, from being violated. Nothing would, in my opinion, be more easy. All that the government would have to do would be to appoint persons to examine into the matter, and the principle of adjustment being so very clear, they would only have to revert to the time when the contract was made, and see what the value of money was then, and make their revision accordingly. I do not perceive how any serious difficulties or discontents could possibly arise from this source, if there were only common prudence used on the part of the government.

—From the *SECOND* letter, it appears, that the writer *formerly* believed, that the high prices arose, not from the increase of paper-money, but from the *increase of gold and silver coin* in Europe. He has now discovered his error; or, at least, he now acknowledges, that the paper-money has depreciated; and says it must continue to depreciate, "*so long as the note shall not be readily exchanged for gold*." He then goes on to say, that even if *light gold* were issued to put coin upon a level with the paper, the latter would sink beneath even that *light gold*, unless the paper was, at the pleasure of the holder, *convertible into gold*.—This gentleman calls upon the bank for *SOME PLAN* to give to a pound sterling of their paper *some certain value in gold*. It is very easy to call upon the bank for such a plan; but, it would be better to make an attempt at least to *chalk out* such plan, the people in Threadneedle street being no more conjurers than other folks.—My opinion as to the *only effectual remedy* for the dreaded

evil is so well known, that I need not repeat it here. It must, indeed, be now manifest to every person, capable of thinking, that an *open competition* between the paper-money and metallic money is the only thing that can bring gold back again into free circulation; and, without such circulation, what must, first or last, be the consequences!—The public have heard of a Report, made by a certain set of gentlemen, belonging to the Honourable House, called "*the Bullion Committee.*" This Report was, I believe, *ordered to be printed*; but, before it returned to the Honourable House in its typographical shape, that Honourable House adjourned. This Report is said to contain, amongst other useful things, a plan for the bringing back of gold coin into circulation; and, I have heard, that the plan is this: that the bank in Threadneedle Street shall pay, on demand, all their small notes (notes of one and two pounds) in metallic money, or coin; that is to say, in gold and silver; but that the said bank shall not be compelled to *begin* this sort of payment in less than *two years* from the time of passing the act!—I give this as mere *hearsay*, mind. I have not seen the Report, nor have I my information from any one who has given it upon his own word as derived from a sight of the Report. It is, therefore, merely hearsay; but it is very generally talked of amongst politicians, and, therefore, I notice it.—Now, not to waste our time upon the ludicrous idea of the *two years* postponement, what would be the effect of such a measure, if it were, at this time, adopted, all the other laws relative to money remaining in force? Suppose, now, that we were to read, in the news-papers, to-morrow: "The bank in Threadneedle Street is now ready to give gold and silver in exchange for all its one and two pound notes." Does the reader imagine, that he would be able to get to the bank door, or even to Threadneedle Street? There have been seen crowds in London; but never such a crowd as such a notification would draw together. Every small note would be tendered instantly. And *how long* does the reader imagine, that the guineas would remain in circulation after they got out of the bank? But, really, it is to insult the understanding of the reader to dwell any longer upon the consequences of such a plan, which, I still think, never can have been seriously proposed.—Upon the subject of the more recent stoppages of

payment at the Banker's shops, it would be useless to say much; though I cannot help observing, that, in his paper of the 27th of last month, Mr. PERRY was rather premature in calling my observations *querulous*; and in saying that he was proved to have been right in his prediction, that "*the failures would not extend to old established Houses*; that the alarm "*would subside in a week*; and that it was "*not on the side of want of credit* that any "*serious calamity was to be apprehended.*" In announcing to us, however, as he has done to day (1st August) the stoppage of MESSRS. DEVAYNES AND Co. of Pall Mall, he has furnished us with a pretty good presumptive proof of his being wrong in all the above points. It is *want of confidence*, and that alone, which has produced the effects which we now behold: and that want of confidence has arisen from the currency of the country not being convertible into gold.—I do not say, that this want of confidence *will*, at this time, become general; but, there is no security that it *will not*; and, it is not, at any rate, to be supposed, that it will be stopped all at once. The fall of DEVAYNES must naturally produce the fall of others; and, if not of other banks, of other men, whose fate will be a warning to their neighbours.—While this is going on, the *hoarding* and *exporting* of the gold, and even of the silver, will proceed with redoubled activity. They are, in effect, the same thing for the present. The consequence of both is, an *increase of the paper*, to supply the place of the absconding Jacobin Guineas; and the consequence of that is a *further depreciation of the paper*, which as naturally produces a *further want of confidence*: and thus the system must and will proceed, until the day when there shall be an *open competition between gold and paper.*

CORN CROPS.—While we hear such positive assertions as to the abundance of the crops now upon the ground, and hear so much anger expressed against those, who venture to doubt of that abundance, it is not a little surprizing, that wheat, that *foreign* wheat, should still keep up to *thirty pounds a load*; that is to say, six pounds a quarter, or, fifteen shillings for the Winchester Bushel. So that, really, to talk of the prospect of a *fair average crop* is to discover either very great ignorance upon the subject, or a most outrageous determination to persevere in error.—But, what has struck me most

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forcibly, upon this subject, is the accounts which we hear of the state of *Ireland*, in which country, be it well remembered, it was asserted, during the last session of parliament, that the corn in Ireland was *so abundant*, that the distilleries ought to be re-opened to grain; and opened they were accordingly.—What is *now* the fact? Let the reader judge of the state of the corn crops in Ireland from the following paragraph, published in the *Morning Chronicle* of the 30th of last month as an extract from the then-last-received *Dublin Journal*.—"The people of this metropolis, and of Ireland in general, should feel truly grateful to those distillers, who, we understand, have come to the laudable resolution of *stopping until the 29th of September*.—To so high a price have provisions come, (wheat, three guineas a barrel—flour forty shillings a cwt.!) that had those gentlemen not come to this determination, nothing could ensue in these lamentable times but a *general starvation!*"—This is what one may call "a broad hint" to the distillers to discontinue the use of corn; for, as to any such resolution having been *voluntarily* entered into by any of the distillers, that is by no means to be believed.—I do not know what a barrel of wheat is; but, supposing the hundred weight to be 112lb. as it is in England, the flour, at forty shillings a hundred weight, is rather more than 4d. $\frac{3}{4}$ a pound, and that is, I believe, 1s. 8d. $\frac{1}{2}$ for four in weight equal to a quartern loaf. A pound of flour and a pound of bread are of the same price at the baker's shop; at least so it is in that part of England which I am most acquainted with. At any rate, there can be no great difference; for, though a pound of flour will make more than a pound of bread, there is the expence of baking to be put to the bread side of the account.—Now, therefore, the hundred weight in Ireland is greater than that in England; or the statement in this paragraph, respecting flour, is false; or, the price of the quartern loaf, in Dublin, is *twenty pence halfpenny*; that is, within three half-pence of being as dear as it was in England at the dearest time in the year of the great scarcity, 1801.—And, this was the country, in which, no longer ago than the *month of March last*, there was such plenty of corn, that it was necessary to re-open the Distilleries in order to make away with it! Aye, and upon this very ground of abundance in Ireland was the

renewal of the law of prohibition rejected! —Not to Dublin only is the misery confined, as appears clearly from the following article published in the *Courier* of the 26th of July, whence the situation of the unfortunate Irish will be easily imagined.—"The present melancholy condition of business, and the utter want of employment for the manufacturing poor, casts upon the better orders of society at this juncture a very necessary and imperative duty. It is in seasons of this sort that affluence has the opportunity of rebuking in poverty those sensations of envy which the natural and unavoidable inequality of life usually excites, by a generous and munificent assistance; such as may shew that comparative prosperity does not always render the heart callous, and that charity may be the companion, as doubtless it may, of opulence.—Relief to a considerable extent has been afforded to the distresses of the poor of this city, and very pointed discrimination has been used to direct the public bounty to proper objects; yet *so general is the pressure of poverty at this period*, that all the means provided to afford relief, threaten to become inadequate, and many interesting objects of genuine misery yet want the solace of necessary sustenance to keep life from sinking.—The present system of granting relief by allowing bread and soup on tickets, which are given gratis to applicants, would, in less than a month, consume the sum of nearly 500*l.* which is all that now remains of 1440*l.*, the sum originally collected; and as the distress of the poor is not likely to abate for much more than that time, it is become necessary that some other arrangement should be adopted.—The *Committee*, therefore, have resolved to withdraw the tickets which are at present held by any persons, who are not tradesmen or persons dependent upon them, and to have a quantity of soup and biscuit ready to be delivered for tickets which may be purchased by the well disposed part of the community, at 1s. 8d. per dozen, by which means other deserving objects, besides tradesmen (who are the immediate objects of the institution) may be relieved, and the original fund be preserved against sudden exhaustion. The public, it is hoped, will lend their co-operation to the Committee in this plan by purchasing the tickets, and by taking care, in

"the distribution of them, to give no ticket to any person who holds a *daily ticket* from the Committee."—Now, thou mercenary "AMERICAN," wilt thou say, that this is "all imaginary?" You knew well of the existence of miseries like these, when you were drawing your lying picture. Oh! that you had to subsist upon these tickets for biscuit and soup!—This is no representation of mine. It is no "jacobin" account. It proceeds from no jacobinical conspiracy. It comes to me through the columns of a *ministerial newspaper*—Poor Irish! Their situation is, indeed, such as demands our kindest thoughts and our kindest acts; and, I am confident, that there are none but the *hardened*, in England, whose hearts will not have answered to the impressive call of SIR FRANCIS BURDETT, the other day, at the Crown and Anchor, in behalf of this suffering nation. The whole of his speech was admirable; but that part of it which related to Ireland most admirable. He alluded to the Subscriptions, made in this country for *foreigners*; why not make such subscriptions for our unfortunate fellow subjects in Ireland? Do we suppose, that the well-being of the people of Ireland is less interesting to us, than the well-being of a swarm of foreign refugees? Why, then, do not the turtle-patriots and their abettors open subscriptions for the unfortunate Irish? Really, to look at the conduct of some people, one would suppose, that they looked upon Ireland as a country, with which this country has nothing at all to do.—To return a little to the manner, above described by the *Courier*, of affording relief to the Irish people, what a spectacle, Good God! must the city of Cork (the second in the kingdom) exhibit at this moment! The "*tradesmen*" suing for a passport to a mess of biscuit and soup! The real value of each mess may be easily ascertained by the circumstance of the tickets being proposed to be sold for 1s. 8d. a dozen, or, a little more than *three half pence each*. A three-halfpenny meal, received once a day, is a thing which it really makes one's heart ache to think of. My daily allowance of bread in this prison is worth three times as much, and costs three times as much. What, under such circumstances, must be the miseries of the mass of the people? We have seen Subscriptions for all sorts of foreigners; and I do hope, that something in the same way will be done, or attempted at least,

for the unfortunate people of Dublin and Cork.—In speaking of the *sort of food*, which, as appears from the *Courier*, the rich are doling out to the poor in Ireland, it has occurred to me to give it as my opinion, that the best sort of all, to be given to people in want, is *good bread*, which is, as it was in the time when the Old Testament was written, *the staff of life*. But, some how or other, almost all your professed philanthropists, and especially your agricultural improvers, appear to have racked their imaginations to discover the means of making labourers live without bread, quite forgetting that just and forcibly expressed injunction of Holy Writ: "Thou shalt not muzzle the ox as he treadeth out the corn." And, if not the ox, shall the man, shall the labourer, be muzzled?—Talk not to me, then, of *substitutes* for bread; you may as well talk to me at once of *substitutes for food*. We hear many of these improvers talk of *bettering* the condition of the poor; but, the great end of their labours always is, to make those, who till the land; those to whose sweat and pain and care we owe the whole of the produce of the earth; to make these live upon something not heretofore known as human food; or, at best, to lower the quality of that food.—Too much of this description are the endeavours of MR. CURWEN, the *parliamentary reformer*, who, upon a recent occasion, was the first to declare his resolution of " *rallying round His Majesty's Government*," and who has published a book, entitled: "*Hints on Agricultural Subjects, and on the best means of improving the condition of the labouring classes*."—Now, if I were to set about an improvement of this sort, I should certainly begin by *adding to the wages of the labourer*, in order that he might be able to buy himself food in greater abundance and of a better quality than the food he now consumes. So far, however, is this from being the mode of proceeding recommended by Mr. CURWEN, that he speaks of "*fermented flour*," that is to say, *bread*, as being a great waste in a poor man's family. He tells us, that to *ferment* the flour produces a great loss; attributes the use of *fermented bread* to luxury and *affected delicacy*; says that the use of it was formerly confined to great towns and even to the higher classes in those towns; and adds, that the wheat formerly appropriated to bread was ground only into *meal*, which was mixed with that of peas, beans, or barley, and used by all the

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working people in *solid* bread! That is to say, in heavy lumps of baked dough! The use of fermented bread, which is here called "*a waste of bread-corn*," is called "*a most serious and efficient evil*!" This is not, however, a set of original remarks. Mr. Curwen only quotes them from "*an Anti-Jacobin Writer*;" but he says, they "*are highly deserving attention, and as such*," (any knowledge of grammar is beneath him) "*he takes the liberty of recommending them most strenuously*." This is a *hint*, is it, for "*improving the condition of the labouring classes*!" That a professed *Anti-Jacobin*, keeping his name out of sight, should have the merciless insolence to publish such observations, does not at all surprize me; but, that they should receive the unqualified approbation of Mr. Curwen, or of any man, putting his name to his work, is what I could not have believed. What! tell us that your object is to *improve* the condition of the labouring classes, and then propose that they shall no longer eat fermented bread, but eat the *lumpish dough*, made of the *meal* of wheat mixed with that of peas, beans, or barley; far worse food than any man attempts to give to his dogs; food which dogs would almost starve before they would eat? Is this your way, Mr. Curwen, of *improving* the condition of the labouring classes? It is not *my* way, fond as the Attorney General says I am of "*base lucre*." I add to the quantity of bread, and I put meat with the bread. I am for none of your *milk diets*. I take care that every man who works for me has the means of having one good meal of *meat* in every day, and a pot or two of beer once or twice a week. That's my way; that's the "*base-lucre*" way of "*improving the condition of the labouring classes*."—Another time I will enter upon a little fuller exposure of the work of this great manufacturer of milk; but, there is one more "*hint*," which I must notice even now. It makes part of what Mr. Curwen calls an "*interesting communication*," sent him by "*a very intelligent officer, who had served long in India*." A good *school*, wherein to study the mode of treating the labouring classes! This intelligent friend of Mr. Curwen, is giving an account of the manner in which they fed the horses, in the army of LORD LAKE; and that leads him to "*hint*," in the following words: "*The general scarcity of grain which prevailed at that time induced many thousands to flock to the British Camp in*

search of food, and I daily witnessed, for weeks together, many hundreds, of all ages and sexes, coming into the lines of our cavalry, and anxiously collecting and carrying away, the EXCREMENT as it fell from the horses. This they exposed for a few hours to the sun, and, by rubbing and sifting it, procured a large supply OF FOOD!"—Was there ever before related a fact so degrading to human nature as this! What must have been the turn of mind of the man, who could have put this fact upon paper, without accompanying it with an expression of his abhorrence? Mr. Curwen does not, indeed, actually point out this way of collecting food to the use of the labouring classes in England, he does not recommend that they, or any part of them, should be thus fed from our cavalry camps or barracks in England; but, neither does he discover any symptom of horror at seeing human nature so foully dishonoured in India, nor the smallest sign of pity for the poor creatures, impelled by hunger to court degradation unparalleled, degradation bringing them to a level with the very lowest of the brute creation.—To return, for a moment, to Ireland, is it not a mortifying, is it not a heart-piercing, reflection, that, in that fine country, so favoured by nature, marked out seemingly by Providence as the seat of plenty and happiness, the people should be in want of a sufficiency of food; and, that in the city of Cork, the emporium of provisions, the strand whence are shipped no small part of the beef and pork and butter and flour that feed our fleets our armies and our colonies; that, in this city, the principal trade of which consists in shipping off the *superabundance* of the kingdom, the inhabitants should be driven to accept of three-half-penny soup-tickets to keep them from absolute starvation!—When the people of Cork are beholding, as it appears they now are, thousands of miserable wretches parading their streets, crying out for food, let them reflect upon what was said by me, last winter (Vol. XVII. p. 241), in the hope of prevailing upon the parliament to continue the prohibition of the use of corn in the Distilleries. If my advice had been followed, the flour in Ireland would not now have been 40 shillings the hundred weight.—One thing that now ought to be done, is, to let all the soldiers in the kingdom have leave to work during the harvest. This measure, especially if the weather should prove

what is called a *catching time*, would make a very material difference in the price of bread after the harvest. And this is a measure completely in the power of the government.

PORTUGAL AND SPAIN.—The accounts from our army in these countries have been very flattering of late. To be sure, Lord Talavera has sent word (see another part of this Number), that the French have taken a Spanish city, Ciudad Rodrigo; and, it is, I believe, understood that *he was very near to the spot* with his army, while the siege was going on. The French state roundly (in an article published in the *Times* of the 2nd instant) that the English army was within six leagues of the walls of the now-taken city; and this does not very well agree with the accounts, noticed in my last Number, and which accounts stated that the French had but 25 thousand men. The French do, some how or other, *get on*; we are told, in our news-papers, from "most respectable authority," that all manner of evils betide the French; that Colonel Talbot, with 50 men under him, totally defeated 300 French, killing 140 and making 33 prisoners, 2 of whom were officers, though, unfortunately Colonel Talbot was killed and *his body had not been recovered*; that the French have recently been beaten by the Spaniards at Pando, whence 400 carts loaded with wounded French were sent into Madrid; that the French have been beaten by the Spaniards at Ciudad Real; that the peasants of Olot have destroyed 1,000 of the French and cleared that part of the country of them; that the Marquis of Romana's army is in good case; that, while all this was going on in the way of beating the French, the French armies were greatly suffering from desertion; that it had been announced officially at Lisbon, on the 6th of July, that, of the *Polish division* (*foreigners, mind!*) which had entered Spain, 1,500 had deserted, and had actually joined the Spanish army, and that the rest, with bayonets fixed, had declared to their officers, that they should march back to Poland; and, besides all this, that the desertion from the French army in Castile was *equal to what it was in other provinces*; that not a day passed without some deserter coming in; that, in the beginning of July, 50 men had come over at one time; that of a Swiss Regiment (*more foreigners, mind!*) in garrison at Astorga, the greater part had, in like manner deserted; that these men were going to

incorporate themselves with the Spanish corps. — Such is the deplorable state of the French, as described in the *Morning Chronicle* (and in most of the other London News-papers) of the 31st July and 1st August. My Lord Talavera tells us, that the *Portuguese* soldiers have *behaved well*; so that, it seems, there is a Portuguese army, then, notwithstanding what was, last week, said by the news-papers in London, about the *not knowing* any thing of the existence of a Portuguese. One of these papers, on the 23rd of July, published, as part of an extract of a letter from an officer of rank in our army, the following words: "As to the Spanish and Portuguese armies *no one seems to know any thing about them.*" I said, that this must be false, seeing that we were *paying* 30,000 Portuguese Soldiers for the year. And, it now appears that I was right; for, not only is there a Portuguese army in *existence*, but my Lord Talavera says, that the soldiers of it actually fight. He says, in his official letter, that a battalion of Portuguese Chasseurs have "displayed their *steadiness* and *courage*, during the movements of the advanced guard, and in several skirmishes with the enemy." — This is very satisfactory intelligence; and, I think, when taken into view, accompanied with the above-mentioned lamentable condition of the French army, the soldiers of which were, apparently, deserting in every direction, would fairly warrant a conclusion decidedly favourable to the cause of us and our allies; nay, a conclusion, that, in a few months, we should hear of the French being completely driven out of Spain and Portugal. — Let me be understood, however. I mean, of course, that such a conclusion is warranted only on condition that the premises are *true*; only on condition that our news-papers have spoken *truth* in telling us (from the Spanish and Portuguese Gazettes), that the French were every where beaten, and that their army was daily wasting away in consequence of desertion. — As the public will, doubtless, be disposed to indulge the hope, that the pleasing side of the prospect is the real one, they will feel relieved from all apprehensions as to the ulterior consequences of Buonaparté's conquering Spain and Portugal; they will be relieved from the horrors of an invasion of Ireland from the ports of Spain and Portugal, while a numerous French fleet shall appear at the mouths of the Scheldt, the

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Meuse and the Rhine, or in the ports and harbours near them. From these and all like apprehensions the public will be relieved, if they give credit to the recent accounts from Spain and Portugal; and which accounts, observe, are mostly said to have been taken from the *Lisbon Gazette*, which, as every one must be aware, contains nothing which has not the sanction of those in authority, who, doubtless, would not sanction the publication of falsehoods.—I beg leave, however, to be understood as not giving even any *opinion* as to the authenticity of these accounts. I act the humble part of a mere abridger, giving my author in every instance. I give no intelligence of my own. I only presume to retail, at second hand, what is issued out from the great manufactories. Nay, I hardly dare do this; and I get myself, sometimes, most grossly abused for nothing in the world but repeating, in substance, after these worthies, what they have said at large. Aye! it is not convenient for *some* of them to have their assertions *recorded*. Their villainous falsehoods; their base endeavours to buoy up, to deceive, to cheat, the public, having answered the special purpose for which they were intended, would, were it not for me, be rubbed off the memory of the public by succeeding endeavours of the same sort; but, I put the falsehoods upon record, I give the public a retrospect, a bird's-eye view of past attempts to deceive; I place the facts in a situation easily to be recurred to; thus I render the manufacturing of falsehoods not so pleasant a trade; and, for this cause it is that the worthies do so hate and so abuse me.—At the risk, however, and even with the certainty, of being hated and abused by them, I shall persevere, and now with more attention than ever, in my detections and exposures of their falsehoods. I have now more time; and I am sure that that time cannot be better employed than in increased efforts in the cause of truth. Let political *humbug* and *fraud*; let the hirelings of the press; let those who cheat with the pen, beware, therefore; for, I have now the *time* as well as the inclination and the ability, to do towards them that which truth and justice demand.—It must be obvious to every man of any reflection, that no small part of the present difficulties and dangers of this country have arisen from that delusion, which has been propagated by the press. To every such person it must be manifest, that, had it

not been for this delusion, the nation never could have been brought into the state, in which it now is. I have done much to prevent such delusion, and I have sometimes succeeded; but, it is now my intention, and my firm resolution to do more than I hitherto have done. Peculation, Public Robbery, Political fraud, shall, if it please God to preserve my life and health, have no cause for exultation.

THOUSAND LASHES.—For the following article, which I shall insert without comment, and merely for the sake of having the thing upon record, I am indebted to the *MORNING POST* news-paper, of the 1st of August 1810.—“A general Court Martial has lately been held at Brighton on Robert Curtis, a corporal in the Oxford regiment of militia, on charges preferred against him, viz. Charge 1. for having on different occasions, endeavoured to excite a spirit of discontent and dissatisfaction, by attempting to persuade the men of the Oxford regiment of militia that they had been defrauded by their colonel of certain articles; viz. shoes, stocks, &c.—Charge 2. for also having spoke disrespectfully of his colonel and his officers, particularly on the 24th of June last.—Charge 3. for having made a false accusation against colonel Gore Langton, commanding the Oxford regiment of militia, in a letter addressed to lord Charles Somerset commanding the Sussex district, stating that he had laid the circumstances of his complaint before the colonel, who had refused him satisfaction.—Upon which charges the prisoner has been found *Guilty* of the whole, and is sentenced to receive 1,000 *lashes*, and to be reduced to the ranks.”

It was my intention to have given here a view of the *affairs of Holland*, and to have offered some observations on the *probable consequences* of the recent measures of the Emperor Napoleon with regard to that country; but I have not room. King Louis's Manifesto will be found in another part of this sheet.—The Article from the *MONITEUR* (which I have copied from the *TIMES* news-paper of yesterday,) is well worthy of attention. With its *sentiments* I have nothing to do; but, the *facts* are well worthy of *inquiry* at least; nor shall we, if we are wise, be too hasty in despising its *threats*.—The wise way; that which *prudence*, even cold and cautious *prudence*, points out to us, is to endeavour to come at a *true* estimate of our situation. Nothing but the greatest

folly joined with the basest of cowardice can make us shut our eyes to open, flagrant, broad-day truth; and, if we should be deluded into such wilful blindness, our ruin is at hand. A hireling slave's bombastical flattery, whether in prose or verse, will not turn aside a ball or blunt the point of a bayonet; neither will it supply the place of gold or bread.—I, therefore, beseech those of my countrymen, who really love that country; who would rather die *Englishmen* than live in affluence unworthy of that name, to endeavour, while it is of any use, to form a correct opinion as to the state of the country, its resources, its powers, its difficulties, its dangers; for, they may be well assured, that, unless the danger is *known before hand*, it cannot be resisted.

WM. COBBETT.

State Prison, Newgate, Friday,
3d August, 1810.

LETTERS OF THE LATE REV. JOHN BRAND,
RELATIVE TO DEPRECIATION OF PAPER-
MONEY.—1804.—(*Concluded from p.*
128.)

Letter to Mr. Cobbett.

Now the dollars are to be issued as "tokens for five shillings." In the first case, the obligation would be written on a worthless piece of paper; in the second, stamped on a valuable piece of silver. It is a metallic bank note for 5s., as a guinea has been called a bill for a certain quantity of commodities on the whole world, that is, the civilized world. Has this new kind of bill less credit because it has a value independent of the solvency of the emitting company, and that nearly equal to its current value? or does this additional security debase it, and not only so, but all its paper with which it before was at par?

§ 8. I must yet in conclusion add, that the depreciation of one part of the national currency, the bank paper here spoken of, is a relative depreciation only, taking place when a discount to be fixed between the holder and the purchaser is allowed to obtain coin for a bill. And when such a discount takes place, the depreciation of the currency is partial. Such was truly the case with respect to bank paper in the reign of William; when only £.85 in money could be obtained for a bank note of the then nominal value of £.100, or it was at £.15 per cent. discount. But the effect of such a fall will

be to reduce the price of commodities paid for in coin; or as it has been sometimes called to appreciate the latter, for it will evidently produce the same consequence with respect to the value of coin, as taking fifteen 100ths of the paper out of circulation. I only add, that I think that the consideration of the rise of prices of commodities, or the reciprocal circumstance, the fall of the value of the whole aggregate of the currency taken collectively, should not enter into this question, which has nothing to do with the absolute value of the currency as measured by commodities, but which simply relates to the *ratio* which the values of equal nominal amounts of metallic and paper currency may come to bear to each other, when they shall vary from that of equality; and whether such variation has taken place; but to go into the reasons of my entering this caveat, would lengthen my letter too much. I am, Dear Sir,
Yours truly, &c. J. BRAND.

PAPER MONEY.

Sir;—If the allusion which you have made in your last number, p. 110, to "a very old and much esteemed correspondent," refers to the author of the article entitled "The Bankruptcies of Bankers," which I sent you in the beginning of the week, I have to express my regret, that I have been so unfortunate in the expression of my meaning as to leave you room to ask, "could I suppose that you ever imagined that rents and taxes would remain what they are?" No, Sir, for every possible reason it was impossible for me to do any such thing. All I supposed possible was; that it might have escaped your notice, that to begin to lower rents and taxes, indeed all claims in money, with the commencement of the decline of the paper system, and to lower the first in the ratio, in which the want of confidence brings down the latter, is the only possible means of preventing the exit of that system from destroying the relation, in which the possessors of real property at present stand to each other: and from aggravating the calamities that have resulted from its establishment. And I only supposed this possible, because I do not recollect (many years as I have been the constant reader of the Political Register) that you have ever touched upon the principle. It is, however, possible, that, with all the attention I have paid to the bearings of the

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paper system, I may be mistaken as to the adequacy of this principle to avert the calamities, which I dread from its fall; but, if so, to whom can I look for correction but you? At any rate I am under the conviction, that the means of letting down the paper system, without calamities, similar to those, which have resulted from its fall in Salisbury, is among the most important subjects that can occupy your attention—I beg leave, with every sentiment of esteem, to subscribe myself, Sir, yours truly,

H. CAMPBELL.

Surrey Street, July 31st, 1810.

PAPER-MONEY.

SIR;—In the 14th Volume of your Register, page 245, you did me the honour to publish a few observations which I sent you relative to the Public Debt and Sinking Fund. I also took occasion to remark that whilst the pound sterling was annually suffering a depreciation in its value; compared with coin or labour, the precious metals had, in the general market of the world, sustained a similar depreciation; which prevented any inconvenience being felt from the restriction on the Bank of England in their cash payments; as a one pound note and a shilling would constantly purchase the same in the market as a guinea. I attributed this alteration of value in the precious metals to the increased quantity furnished from America, and the lessened demand for them in France, and on the Continent, since the Revolution, where church and family plate have been melted down and thrown into the market as bullion. It, at that time, appeared probable to me, that a contrary effect would be produced, whenever confidence should be again restored on the Continent, and a demand for the precious metals should return. This seems to have been gradually taking place for some time past, and, as bullion was not to be obtained freely at the Bank for their notes, the market price has risen above the mint price; in other words the pound note will not procure the same weight of gold as it used to do.—This is a matter entirely distinct from the alteration of the prices of every necessary of life in consequence of the altered value of the metals themselves; for we have seen for some years past, that whilst there was little demand for gold in exchange for notes, the market and mint prices continued nearly the same. It was, in all respects, as if

specie could have been demanded. But the moment that specie was demanded, and could not be obtained, a difference in these prices became conspicuous. I suspect this is the natural effect, and so long as the note shall not be readily exchanged for gold, the difference will encrease. If the pound sterling be not made to represent a certain weight of gold and silver, for which it used to be readily exchanged, it will become worth only so much as it can be exchanged for. Suppose the Bank were now to issue guineas of a reduced weight to be equal to the present market price of bullion, but that the supply of these reduced coins should not be as abundant as the demand, a depreciation would become again apparent, and a further diminution of weight would be necessary. The value of every thing is that for which it may be exchanged readily; and unless the Bank adopt some plan to give the pound sterling, (itself a fictitious coin) some certain value in gold, a money price and a paper price for every commodity seems the natural result.—The country bankers' notes are measured by Bank of England notes, which may be demanded for them at the option of the holders, therefore their circulation is assisted by the system of withholding specie; but if the latter could be demanded, both the Bank of England and the country banks must issue their notes with more caution.—In the present moment when alarm is excited by some recent failures, it becomes of the first importance to prevent the circulating medium being further depressed.—If you think these remarks deserving a place in your impartial Register, I shall be gratified by your inserting them as early as may be convenient to you. I am, Sir, &c.

LASEY,

Bristol, 29 July, 1810.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

ABDICATION OF THE KING OF HOLLAND.—

The King to the Legislative Body.

Gentlemen;—I charge the Ministers, met in Council, to present to your Assembly the Resolution to which I have seen myself driven by the military occupation of my capital. The brave soldiers of France have no other enemies than those of the common cause of Holland and myself. They should have been, and ought to be, received with all possible regard and attention; but it is, nevertheless, true,

that in the actual situation of Holland, when an entire army, a crowd of Custom-house officers, and the National Army itself were placed out of the power of the government—when every thing, with the exception of the capital, may be said to be under the order of a foreign officer, I was bound to declare to Marshal the Duke of Reggio, and the Chargé d’Affaires of the Emperor, that if the capital and its district were occupied, I should consider that proceeding as a manifest violation of the laws of nations, and those rights that are deemed most sacred among men. It was this that induced me to refuse the Custom-house officers admission into Muiden, Naarden, and Diemer. I had a right so to do; inasmuch as the treaty only authorizes the presence of the Custom-house officers on the sea-coasts, and at the mouths of the rivers.—On the 16th of last month, I received, through the Chargé d’Affaires of his Majesty the Emperor, an assurance, that it was by no means his intention to occupy Amsterdam; and this led me to hope that a treaty, the conditions of which had been imposed by his Majesty the Emperor himself, would be strictly observed, and be in no respect infringed upon. Unfortunately my error was not of long duration. When I received a communication, that 20,000 French troops were assembling in Utrecht and its environs, notwithstanding the extreme penury and embarrassment of our finances, I consented to furnish them with provisions, and other necessities; though the treaty stipulates that only 6,000 men shall be maintained at the expence of Holland. But I was apprehensive that the assembling of this force would disclose other intentions unfavourable to our government; and accordingly, I did not fail to receive, the day before yesterday, June 29th, official information that his Majesty the Emperor insisted upon occupying Amsterdam, and establishing the head-quarters of the French army in this capital.—In this situation, gentlemen, you cannot doubt, that I should have resigned myself to suffer for my people new humiliations, could I have entertained the hope of preventing new calamities; but I could no longer deceive myself. I assented to the treaty dictated by France, under the conviction that those parts of it that were disagreeable to the nation and myself, would not be enforced; and that, satisfied with that self-denial, if I may so speak, which is the result of this treaty, every

thing would thenceforward go on smoothly between France and Holland.—The treaty, it is true, offers a great number of pretexts for fresh complaints, and fresh accusations. But can pretexts be at any time wanting? I was, therefore, entitled to rely upon the explanations and communications made to me on the subject of this treaty, and the formal and express declarations which I did not fail to make—that the Custom-house officers should interfere only in matters relative to the blockade—that the French troops should be stationed only on the coasts—that the domains of the creditors of the State, and the Crown, should be respected—that the debts of the ceded territories should be charged upon France—and, finally—that from the number of troops to be furnished, a deduction should be made for those actually at the disposal of France in Spain; and also, that the necessary time should be given for the maritime armament. I even continued to flatter myself, that the treaty would be mitigated. I have deceived myself; and, if the absolute devotion which I manifested for the discharge of my duties on the 1st of April last, has served only to drag on, or to prolong, the existence of the country for three months, I have the cruelly painful satisfaction, but the only one I can now have, that I have performed my duty to the last; and that, if I may be permitted so to express myself, I have carried my sacrifices for the existence, and what I conceived to be the welfare of the country, to an unjustifiable extent.—But after the submission and resignation of the 1st of April, I should be extremely culpable if I could rest satisfied with the title of King, being no longer but an instrument; and no longer commanding, not only in the country, but even in my capital; and soon, perhaps, not even in my own palace. I should, nevertheless, be witness to every thing that should be done, without the power of doing any thing for my people; responsible for all events, without being able to prevent, or to influence them. I should have exposed myself to the complaints of both sides, and perhaps have occasioned great misfortunes; by doing which, I should have betrayed my conscience, my people, and my duty! I have for a long time foreseen the extremity to which I am now reduced, but I could not have prevented it without sacrificing my most sacred duties—without ceasing to have at heart the interest of my people—and without ceasing to con-

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fect my fate with that of the country. This I could not do! Now that Holland is reduced to this condition, I have, as King of Holland, but one course to take, and that is, to abdicate the throne in favour of my children. Any other course would have only augmented the misfortunes of my reign. I should have, with deep regret, discharged that tender duty; and I should perhaps have seen the peaceful inhabitants, too often the victims of the quarrels of government, ruined at one blow. How could the idea of any sort of resistance have entered my mind? My children, born Frenchmen like myself, would have seen the blood of their fellow countrymen shed in a just cause, but one which might nevertheless be supposed to be exclusively mine. I had therefore but one course to adopt.—My brother, so violently irritated against me, is not so against my children; and doubtless he will not destroy what he has done, and deprive them of their inheritance; since he has not, nor can have, any subject of complaint against this child, who will not, for a long time to come, reign himself. His Mother, to whom the regency appertains by the constitution, will do every thing that shall be agreeable to the Emperor, my Brother, and will succeed better than myself, who have had the misfortune never to be successful in my endeavours of that kind; and at the conclusion of a maritime peace, perhaps before, my brother, knowing the state of things in this country, the esteem its inhabitants merit, how much their welfare accords with the interests well understood of his empire, will do for this country all it has a right to expect, as the reward of its numerous sacrifices to France, of its fidelity, and the interest with which it cannot fail to inspire those who judge of it without prejudice. Perhaps I am the only obstacle to the reconciliation of this country with France; and should that be so, I might find some kind of consolation in dragging out the remainder of a wandering and a languishing life at a distance from the first objects of my whole affection—this good people, and my son. These are my principal motives; there are others equally powerful with respect to which I must be silent, but they will easily be divined.—The Emperor, my brother, must feel that I could not act otherwise. Though strongly prejudiced against me, he is great, and when his irritation subsides, cannot but be just.—As to you, Gentlemen, I should be much more

unhappy even than I am, if possible, could I imagine that you would not do justice to my intentions. May the end of my career prove to the nation and to you, that I have never deceived you; that I have had but one aim—the true interest of the country; that the faults I may have committed are solely to be ascribed to my zeal, which led me to aim at not what was absolutely the greatest good, but the best that could be attained under all the difficulties of existing circumstances. I had never calculated upon governing a nation so interesting, but so difficult to govern, as yours. Be pleased, gentlemen, to be my advocates with the nation, and cherish a confident attachment to the Prince Royal, who will deserve it, if I may judge from his good disposition. The Queen has the same interests as myself. I cannot, Gentlemen, conclude, without recommending to you, in the most earnest manner, and in the name of the interest and of the existence of so many families, whose lives and property would be infallibly compromised, to receive the French with the attention, with the kindness and the cordiality which is due to the brave troops of the first nation in the world; to your friends, to your allies, who consider obedience as the first of duties, but who cannot fail to esteem the more, the more they become acquainted with it, a nation brave, industrious, and worthy of esteem under every consideration.—In whatever place I may terminate my existence, the name of Holland, and the most lively prayers for its happiness, will be my last words, and occupy my last thoughts.

LOUIS NAPOLEON.

Haarlem, July 1, 1810.

SPAIN AND PORTUGAL.—*From the Moniteur, July 22, 1810.*

The English newspapers never were so full of false news as they have been for these fifteen days past; the reason is, that the English people were never more uneasy; that the English government never stood more in need of deceiving them respecting the mad system which they follow, of wishing to struggle alone on the continent with France! The good sense of the English nation enables them to foresee the dishonour and destruction of their army in Portugal; they are convinced that the most fortunate event which could befall that army would be a catastrophe like that of Moore. The English

are too much accustomed to calculate chances and events not to know that alone against France, they can, in such a contest, meet with only disasters, and obtain only disgrace. Men of sound judgment, like Grenville or Grey, are numerous in England; but they are at present without any influence.

Ministers, therefore, not being able to change the public opinion, endeavour to deceive the people. For instance it is said that General Sebastiani has capitulated: this report is soon contradicted; but it is not the less repeated in a thousand different ways; at one time it was a mule-driver, at another it was the master of a ship which had arrived at Cadiz, who brought these great news!!!—They also wish to occupy the minds of the people about the army of Lord Wellington; this army, it is said, amounting to the dreadful number of 24,000 English! has arrived at such a state of discipline, and the soldiers have so much confidence in their Commander in Chief, that they will be able to beat 70,000 Frenchmen; for it is proved that a British soldier is, for courage, worth at least four French grenadiers!—

The French army says nothing; but it has invested Ciudad Rodrigo, opened the trenches, and is battering in breach. The cries of the inhabitants of Ciudad Rodrigo are heard in Lord Wellington's camp, which is only six leagues distant; but all ears are shut against them. It was thus that the inhabitants of Madrid endeavoured to move Gen. Moore by their cries; but he also shut his ears against them, and Madrid was taken in his sight. And it was thus that very lately the inhabitants of Seville and Andalusia called their most faithful allies to their assistance, and that Wellesley answered them, according to the constant custom of his country, Get out of the scrape the best way you can!—

The following particulars respecting the affairs of Spain are positive:—That the French and English armies are in sight of each other on the frontiers of Portugal. — That in this situation the French are besieging Ciudad Rodrigo; — That the English do not attempt any thing towards giving succour to that city; and that after all their boasting, they will be the laughing stock of Europe, if it is captured within the reach of their cannon. — The editors of the English newspapers turn and twist themselves in a thousand different ways; they intercept letters,

copy libels on the insurrection, and wind themselves into every possible shape in order to induce the nation to believe, that the French armies in Spain are but a confused crowd without discipline; discouraged or incapable to act as soldiers, and commanded by chiefs who are ignorant and without any experience; that the only good troops are those of which the English, Portuguese and Spanish armies consist: but while all this is proclaiming by them, the French armies are in sight of the English army, capturing Astorga, besieging Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz and Cadiz; capturing in Catalonia and Arragon, Lerida, Mequinenza and Hostalrich; the French army in Arragon is besieging Tortosa, and that in Catalonia, Tarragona. The French armies are carrying on five great sieges, and have just terminated five others; they occupy the provinces of Spain from the North to the South, and from the East to the West, and they everywhere repress the robberies which are excited by the intrigues of England.

This necessity felt by the English of deceiving the public respecting the real situation of things, leads them a great way; they published pretended letters from the Emperor Napoleon to the former Queen of the Two Sicilies; ridiculous letters, in which the Emperor Napoleon is represented as making numberless apologies to that furious woman; and while they are printing such absurdities, their cannon of alarm is resounding throughout Sicily! and the Neapolitan navy are covering themselves with glory in the presence of their king, by beating the Anglo-Sicilian fleet.

Respecting the affairs of the continent, they publish at one time, that they are going to have peace with Russia; that a war between France and Russia is going to break out, and that a new coalition is about to be formed; at another that the Emperor Napoleon is forming such or such a project against the tranquillity of Russia, &c.

The great Powers of the Continent are daily drawing tighter the knot by which they are united; they are daily becoming more convinced of the folly of fighting for the English. When Ciudad Rodrigo is captured, the catastrophe will be more imminent for England, and it will then be necessary to call to the helm of the state men who are more prudent, and who are better acquainted with the nature of the resources and of the strength of

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their country, and therefore more moderate. Such men will be sensible of the urgent necessity of liquidating the national debt, of calming their passions, and of giving peace to the world. But never will such results be obtained from presumptuous and ignorant men, who mistake what is well known by every coffee-house waiter in Europe, viz. the influence of the English at sea, and their weakness on land!

AMERICA.—*Correspondence between the Marquis Wellesley and Mr. Pinckney, and between General Armstrong and Mr. Secretary Smith.*

Gen. Armstrong to the Duke of Cadore.

(Continued from p. 96.)

On receiving this information two questions suggested themselves.—1. Whether this decision was or was not extended to ships as well as to cargoes? and 2. Whether the money arising from the sales which might be made under it, would, or would not, be subject to the issue of the pending negotiation? The Gentleman charged with the delivery of your message not having been instructed to answer these questions, it becomes my duty to present them to your Excellency, and to request a solution of them. Nor is it a less duty on my part, to examine the grounds on which his Majesty has been pleased to take this decision, which I understand to be that of reprisal, suggested for the first time in the note you did me the honour to write to me on the 14th ultimo. In the 4th paragraph of this note, it is said, that "his Majesty could not have calculated on the measures taken by the United States, who, having no grounds of complaint against France, have comprised her in their acts of exclusion, and since the month of May last, have prohibited the entry into their ports of French vessels, by subjecting them to confiscation."—It is true that the United States have since the 20th of May last forbidden the entry of French vessels into their harbours; and it is also true that the penalty of confiscation attaches to the violation of this law. But in what respect does this offend France? Will she refuse to us the right of regulating commerce within our own ports? Or will she deny that the law in question is a regulation merely municipal? Examine it both as to object and means—what does it more than forbid American ships from going into the ports

of France, and French ships from coming into those of the United States? And why this prohibition? To avoid injury and insult: to escape that lawlessness, which is declared to be "a forced consequence of the Decrees of the British Council." If then its object be purely defensive, what are its means? Simply a law, previously and generally promulgated, operating solely within the territory of the United States, and punishing alike the infractors of it, whether citizens of the said States, or others. And what is this but the exercise of a right, common to all nations, of excluding, at their will, foreign commerce, and of enforcing that exclusion? Can this be deemed a wrong to France? Can this be regarded as a legitimate cause of reprisal on the part of a power, who makes it the first duty of nations to defend their sovereignty, and who even denationalizes the ships of those who will not subscribe to the opinion?—But it has been said that the "United States had nothing to complain of against France." Was the capture and condemnation of a ship, driven on the shores of France by stress of weather, and the perils of the sea—nothing? Was the seizure and sequestration of many cargoes brought to France in ships violating no law, and admitted to regular entry at the Imperial custom-houses—nothing? Was the violation of our maritime rights, consecrated as they have been by the solemn forms of a public treaty—nothing? In a word, was it nothing that our ships were burnt on the high seas, without any other offence than that of belonging to the United States; or other apology than was to be found in the enhanced safety of the perpetrator? Surely if it be the duty of the United States to resent the theoretical usurpations of the British Orders of November 1807, it cannot be less their duty to complain of the daily and practical outrages on the part of France! It is indeed true, that were the people of the United States destitute of policy, of honour, and of energy (as has been insinuated), they might have adopted a system of discrimination between the two great belligerents; they might have drawn imaginary lines between the first and second aggressor; they might have resented in the one a conduct to which they tamely submitted in the other, and in this way have patched up a compromise between honour and interest equally weak and disgraceful. But such was not the course they pursued, and it is perhaps a

necessary consequence of the justice of their measures that they are at this day an independent nation. But I will not press this part of my subject; it would be affrontful to your Excellency (knowing as you do, that there are not less than one hundred American ships within his Majesty's possession or that of his allies) to multiply proofs that the United States have grounds of complaint against France.

—My attention is necessarily called to another part of the same paragraph, which immediately follows the quotation already made:—"As soon," says your Excellency, "as his Majesty was informed of this measure (the non-intercourse law), it became his duty to retaliate upon the American vessels not only within his own territories, but also in the countries under his influence. In the ports of Holland, Spain, Italy, and Naples, the American vessels have been seized, because the Americans seized French vessels."

These remarks divide themselves into the following heads:

1st, The right of his Majesty to seize and condemn American vessels within his own territories. 2d. The right to do so within the territories of his allies; and, 3d. The reason of that right, viz. "because Americans had seized French vessels."

The first of these subjects has been already examined; and the second must be decided like the first, since his Majesty's rights within the limits of his ally cannot be greater than within his own. If then it has been shewn, that the Non-intercourse Law was merely defensive in its object; that it was but intended to guard against that state of violence which unhappily prevailed; that it was restricted in operation to the territory of the United States, and that it was duly promulgated there and in Europe before execution, it will be almost unnecessary to repeat, that a law of such description cannot authorise a measure of reprisal, equally sudden and silent in its enactment and application, founded on no previous wrong, productive of no previous complaint, and operating beyond the limits of his Majesty's territories, and within those of Sovereigns, who had even invited the commerce of the United States to their ports.

It is therefore the third subject only, the reason of the right, which remains to

be examined; and with regard to it I may observe, that if the alleged fact which forms this reason be unfounded, the reason itself fails, and the right with it. In this view of the business I may be permitted to enquire, when and where any seizure of a French vessel has taken place under the non-intercourse law? and at the same time to express my firm persuasion, that no such seizure has been made: a persuasion founded alike on the silence of the Government and of the journals of the country, and still more on the positive declaration of several well-informed and respectable persons, who have left America as late as the 26th of December last. My conclusion therefore is—that no French vessel having violated the law, no seizure of such vessel has occurred, and that the report, which has reached Paris, is probably founded on a circumstance altogether unconnected with the non-intercourse law or its operation.

Though far from wishing to prolong this letter, I cannot close it without remarking the great and sudden change wrought in his Majesty's sentiments with regard to the defensive system adopted by the United States. The law, which is now believed to furnish ground for reprisal, was communicated to his Majesty in June or July last, and certainly did not then excite any suspicion of feelings unfriendly to the American Government. Far from this, its communication was immediately followed by overtures of accommodation, which, though productive of no possible arrangement, did not make matters worse than they found them.

On the 22d of August last I was honoured with a full exposition of the views and principles which had governed, and which continue to govern his Majesty's policy in relation to the United States, and in this we do not find the slightest trace of complaint against the provisions of the law in question.

At a period later than the 22d of August, an American ship, destined to a port in Spain, was captured by a French privateer. An appeal was made to his Majesty's Minister of War, who, having submitted the case, received orders to liberate all American vessels destined to Spanish ports which had not violated the Imperial Decrees.

(To be continued.)